Feldman and Micali (STOC `88) present in a pioneering document a n-Bizantin Memorandum of Understanding that does not tolerate < n/3 of the malicious parties that rotate in constant expected cycles. Here we show a constant protocol expected for a certified Byzantine agreement, provided an honest majority (i.e. < n/2) and based solely on the existence of a secure signature card and a public key infrastructure (ICP). Combined with existing results, this gives the first permanent protocol expected for a secure calculation with an honest majority in a point-to-point network that supports only unique functions and a PKI. Our main technical tool – a new primitive that we are introducing, the moderate VSS – also provides a simpler proof of Feldman Micali`s result. We also show a simple technique for the sequential composition of protocols without simultaneous termination (something that is inherent in Byzantine contractual protocols with o (s) tricks for the case of t<n/2. CRYPTO 2006: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2006 p. 445-462 | Cite ace.
An Optimal Probabilistic Protocol For Synchronous Byzantine Agreement